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The Metaphor of Proportionality 
 
NICOLA LACEY
*
 
 
The idea of proportionality has figured prominently in moral, legal and political 
theory.   It has been central to the articulation of an ideal of limited punishment in 
modern legal orders.  And it has assumed a central place in judicial and academic 
efforts to lay down standards for legitimate state conduct in a range of areas within 
human rights, administrative and private law.   In this paper, setting out from a broad 
view of the role of metaphor, I map histories of proportionality in different spheres 
(law, politics, culture), spaces (nation states and regions) and legal areas (criminal, 
public, international and private law), before moving on to consider the conditions 
under which abstract ideas like proportionality assume a salience within particular 
spheres of legal or political discourse.  Focusing on the case of appeals to 
proportionality in criminal justice, I then go on to develop an argument about the 
conditions under which they enjoy some capacity to coordinate expectations or 
beliefs, and consider how far this thesis might be generalizable to other fields. 
 
  
                                                          
*
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The idea of proportionality has figured prominently in modern moral, legal and political 
theory.   It has been central to the articulation of an ideal of limited punishment in modern 
legal orders.  And, particularly in recent years, it has assumed a central place in the judicial 
and academic efforts to lay down standards for legitimate state conduct, and for judicial 
oversight of the exercise of power in a range of areas within human rights, administrative, 
public international and private law.   But what role is this pervasive metaphor playing in law 
and legal discourse, and what explains the extraordinary recent upswing in its fortunes?  In 
this paper, I aim to tackle these questions.  Setting out from a broad view of the role of 
metaphor in legal and other social discourses, I map out histories of proportionality in 
different spheres (law, politics, culture), spaces (nation states and regions) and legal areas 
(criminal, public and private law), before moving on to consider the conditions under which 
abstract ideas like proportionality assume a salience within particular spheres of legal or 
political discourse.  Focusing on the case of appeals to proportionality in criminal justice, I 
then go on to develop an argument about the conditions under which they enjoy some 
capacity to coordinate expectations or beliefs, and consider how far this thesis might be 
generalizable to other fields.  In doing so, I clarify the relationship between my argument in 
this paper and that in a recent paper co-authored with Hanna Pickard, in which we argued that 
scholars of criminal justice have been apt to be misled by the apparently determinate power 
of an idea whose force in fact ultimately depends on a surrounding infrastructure of attitudes 
and institutions.
1
 
 
THREE PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS 
 
Before embarking on this project, three preliminary matters must be addressed.  First, we 
need to resolve the question of how we should understand the idea of metaphor in and beyond 
law, and in particular the degree to which metaphor is distinct within language.  Second, we 
need to give an account of why the appeal to metaphor in law and legal discourse might be 
thought to be of distinctive importance to law and society scholarship – an issue which 
immediately invites reflection on the roles or functions of metaphor within the production of 
legal meaning and the exercise of legal power.  And third, we need some account of the 
history, contours and role of proportionality, understood as one of the foundational metaphors 
of modern law.  I shall take each of these questions in turn. 
Starting, then, with our first question, we can set out from the standard dictionary 
definition of metaphor as a figure of speech in which one thing stands in for or represents – 
etymologically, carries over, transfers, carries across – something else to which it does not 
directly refer.  As such, metaphor has much in common with similes, analogies, symbols such 
as images, parables.
2
  In each case, meaning is conveyed by the drawing of a connection 
between ostensibly different phenomena.  And the centrality of both imagery and 
metaphorical language to law – to both its operations in language and our view of it and its 
significance - is immediately apparent: scales of justice; the image of justice as blind; 
‘chains’ of causation are just three obvious examples mentioned at various points in this 
collection.   
But there is nonetheless a puzzle here, and though we should not allow it to paralyse 
the important enterprise of analysing the role of metaphor in law, we must nonetheless pause 
                                                          
1
 N. Lacey and H. Pickard, ‘The Chimera of Proportionality: Institutionalising Limits on Punishment in 
Contemporary Social and Political Systems’, (2015) 78(2) Modern Law Rev. 216. 
2
  Hence the role of metaphor in lending authority and persuasiveness to law is comparable to that of images: C. 
Douzinas and L. Nead (eds.), Law and the Image: The Authority of Art and the Aesthetics of Law (1999); A. 
Gearey, Law and Aesthetics (2001); L. Mulcahy, Legal Architecture: Justice, due process and the place of law 
(2011). 
3 
 
to acknowledge it.  This puzzle lies in the argument – familiar in influential post-structuralist 
work, but also a matter of common sense
3
 – that in some sense language is inevitably 
metaphorical, in that words stand in for things – objects, ideas, situations – which they are 
not.  This complicates the idea of a ‘literal’ correspondence between word and phenomenon 
to which metaphor purportedly stands in contrast, and hence suggests that the metaphoricity 
of language may occupy a spectrum rather than presenting a discrete category of linguistic 
usage.  Moreover this complication seems particularly apposite to legal language, in which so 
many concepts – ‘contract’ would be a good example – constitute at once discrete legal 
entities identified by and with a particular term, and broader social arrangements and ideas 
which are implicitly invoked in the deployment of that legal term.   
While acknowledging this inevitably metaphorical tinge to legal language, I propose 
in what follows to handle the complication which it implies by simply stipulating that my 
focus will be on instances of metaphor in and around law in which the appeal to an idea, 
object or situation, which is not literally that referred to, is playing a certain role in 
transmitting meaning.  The distinctive force of metaphor, in my account, lies in the way it 
assists in the legitimation of the relevant legal arrangement and/or in the coordination of 
social expectations around that arrangement.
4
  This it achieves by implicitly making reference 
to a web of connections reaching well beyond its ostensible point or points of reference.  
(Note that on this approach the metaphoricity of a particular instance of legal language is 
contingent and may change over time: for example, while the terms ‘contract’ and ‘crime’ are 
undoubtedly metaphorical in this sense, the term ‘tort’ is arguably no longer so to a vast 
number of English law’s subjects.)  In taking this stipulative route out of the potential 
dilemma posed by my first question, I am of course also suggesting an answer to my second 
question about the distinctive role of metaphor in law.  If law’s metaphors are playing an 
important role in legitimating and coordinating legal arrangements, then they are central to 
both the significance of law and the stability of law’s place in the constitution of social 
relations. 
Third and finally, then, what do I mean by ‘proportionality’, and what justifies my 
particular focus on appeals to proportionality among the myriad metaphors which populate 
legal discourse and social, cultural and political discourse about law?   On the face of it, this 
focus may seem odd, given proportionality’s origins in ancient mathematics, from which it 
travelled into aesthetics.
5
  But proportionality also has a long history in legal and political 
realms, where it featured in the ancient worlds of Greece, India and Rome, notably as a part 
of just war theory: the proposition that the anticipated benefits of waging a war must be 
proportionate to the harm risked, just as the treatment of those caught up in war must be 
governed by norms of proportionality.
6
   And, I shall argue, this fascinating blend of political, 
                                                          
3
  This argument is taken up in more detail in N. Lacey, 'Community in Legal Theory: Idea, Ideal or Ideology?' 
(1995) 15 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 105. 
4
  Cf. the account of the power of metaphor presented in G. Lakoff’s and M. Johnson’s classic Metaphors We 
Live by (1980). 
5
 The mathematics of proportion are sometimes argued to have been used in an aesthetic context by the Greek 
sculptor Polykleitos as early as the 5
th
 Century BC; better established is the role of proportion in the work of 
Plato and of Euclid in the 1
st
 Century BC, from which it found its way, via Roman thought (see n. 6 below), to 
the work of artists such as Piero della Francesca  and Leonardo da Vinci,  in 15
th
 and 16
th
 Century Italy.  Da 
Vinci in particular provided illustrations for Lucia Pacioli’s De Divina Proportione in 1509, and is often 
credited with inventing the term ‘sectio aurea’, or the ‘golden section’, ‘golden mean’ or ‘golden ratio’, widely 
used in Renaissance art and still exerting influence in modern times – the most spectacular instance perhaps 
being Le Corbusier’s Modulor system of architectural proportion. 
6
 The appeal to proportionality in just war theory may be found in Cicero’s De Officiis Book 1, as in his Treatise 
on the Commonwealth and Treatise on the Laws, and in the Sanskrit epic the Mahabharata; it also features in 
the just war theories of Augustine, Aquinas, Grotius, Hobbes and Locke, among many others.   A number of 
recent articles have set recent appeals to proportionality in the context of this much longer intellectual history: 
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logical and aesthetic meaning assumed a particular salience in the construction of modern 
ideas of the rule of law in Europe from the 17
th
 Century on.   
It is useful to set out from a clear formal meaning to proportionality.  An appeal to 
proportionality indicates a claim about the existence of a broad moral or practical equivalence 
or comparability between two different phenomena: a wrongful act and a punishment; an 
assault and a reaction in self-defence; a piece of negligent conduct and an award of damages; 
a prima facie discriminatory impact and a compensating legitimate purpose; a perceived 
social problem or danger and a governmental response which imposes certain social costs or 
impinges upon certain rights.  As such, proportionality is an essentially analogical concept, 
and hence, while not a metaphor in the strict sense of the term, nonetheless presents a 
paradigm of what we might call the method of metaphor: in other words, it conveys meaning 
by evoking a relationship between two different phenomena.
7
  And precisely because of this 
method of claiming equivalence or comparability between two different things, the upshot of 
an appeal to proportionality depends either on surrounding social consensus about that 
comparability or on institutional mechanisms or arrangements which can produce, stabilise 
and legitimate a particular judgment of ‘proportional’ equivalence – an issue to which I will 
return below.   
Note, however, that the very word, or concept, of proportionality arguably at least 
begins this work of legitimation or justification, because of the way in which an appeal to 
proportionality evokes an ideal of harmony, natural (quasi-geometric) order or coherence 
founded on reason and issuing in fairness, social justice and limits on power. And, 
notwithstanding its ancient origins, proportionality has assumed a distinctive importance in 
the self-conception of modern social orders, contributing to what Charles Taylor has called a 
‘modern social imaginary’.8  This is why, for example, appeals to proportionality loom so 
large in the foundational texts of modern political philosophy. Proportionality stands as a key 
concept in the long history of efforts not only to modernise and temper punishment or to 
rationalise and civilise the retributive approach which dominated pre-modern punishment, but 
also more generally as a source of the discursive legitimation of power.  This it achieves by 
purporting to bring discretionary power within limits by establishing a criterion of 
appropriateness for its exercise, in the form of a normative relationship between an exercise 
of power and that (the wrongdoing or harm inherent in or proceeding from the relevant 
conduct) in relation to which the power is being exercised.  Hence the concept of 
proportionality occupies a central place in the work of Enlightenment thinkers and reformers 
across many nations: Montesquieu, Beccaria, Jefferson and Bentham, to name just four of the 
most important.
9
   
The centrality of appeals to proportionality in underpinning the evolution of modern 
criminal justice systems and in evoking the notion of rationally limited and appropriately 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
see for example E. Engle, ‘The History of the General Principle of Proportionality: An Overview’, 10 
Dartmouth Law Journal 1-11 (2012), which traces the origins of the concept of proportionality in political 
morality back to Aristotle;  and T. Poole, ‘Proportionality in Perspective’, (2010) New Zealand Law Review 369, 
which traces the concept back to the ideas of cosmic order in Plato and republican balance or harmony in 
Cicero, emphasising its metaphysical or even ‘celestial’ inflection, as well as its role in identifying the political 
community to which its requirements apply. 
7
  The closely related concept of ‘balancing’ is of course a more central case of metaphor.  I have chosen to 
focus on proportionality because of both its longer history in legal-political discourse and its yet wider reach 
across different systems and doctrinal areas.  
8
 C. Taylor, Modern Social Imaginaries (2004) 
9
  C. L. de Montesquieu, De l'esprit des loix (1748); C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments [1764] (2009); T. 
A. Jefferson, ‘A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital’, in The Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson, ed. J. P. Boyd (1950); J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation (ed. H.L.A. Hart and J.H. Burns) [1781] (1996).  For discussion, see J. Q. Whitman, ‘The Transition 
to Modernity’, in The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law ed. M. Dubber and T. Hörnle (2014) ch. 5. 
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exercised power which characterises modern ideas of legality or the rule of law, which form 
the main object of my interpretation in this paper, would arguably in itself be sufficient to 
justify selecting proportionality as my focus in this analysis of law’s metaphors.   But the role 
of proportionality in discourse within and about law is, of course, not exhausted by the 
criminal law and, particularly in the legal systems of the continent of Europe,
10
   
proportionality has long occupied a central position in the construction of legal mechanisms 
of checking public power, and hence in the articulation of principles of judicial review. 
Moreover in recent years, appeals to proportionality both in judicial discourse and in political 
and cultural discourse about law and about law reform have experienced a huge growth, with 
proportionality tests in public law travelling via European legal institutions and via 
international human rights norms into the common law; and with proportionality in the 
United States travelling from its Eighth Amendment origins and alternating with the familiar 
concept of balancing in various areas of constitutional and private law.
 11  
   Alongside the 
continuing renaissance of neoclassical ideas of penal justification, represented in sentencing 
guideline systems and the espousal of justice- or just desert-based sentencing reform in many 
jurisdictions,
12
 proportionality can therefore claim to be one of the central metaphors 
underpinning the persuasiveness, legitimacy and coordinating power of modern law. 
 
HISTORIES OF PROPORTIONALITY: A MAP 
 
To engage in any really thorough project of mapping these various histories of 
proportionality across time, space and subject matter would be a massive task, well beyond 
the scope of a single paper.  It is worth noting that such a project would be a hugely valuable 
contribution to historicised socio-legal enquiries, and a very useful complement to existing 
work tracking the genealogy of other social, legal and political concepts of central importance 
to the trajectory of modern social orders:  the individual self and personhood;
13
 human 
                                                          
10
 I. Porat and M. Cohen-Eliya Proportionality and Constitutional Culture (2013) ch. 1. 
11
 For key examples amid an extensive literature indicating the salience of appeals to proportionality in the penal 
theory literature and its analogous recent deployment in other areas such as human rights, and public, 
international and private law across many jurisdictions, see R. Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights (J. 
Rivers trans., 2002); A. Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and their Limitations (2012); J. Bomhoff, 
Balancing Constitutional Rights (2013): 10-30; R. S. Frase, ‘Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, 
and the Eighth Amendment: “Proportionality” Relative to What?’ (2004) 89 Minnesota Law Rev.; A. Ristroph, 
‘Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government’ (2005) 55 Duke Law J. 263. G. Letsas, ‘Rescuing 
Proportionality’, in R. Cruft, M. Liao and M. Renzo (eds.), Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, 
(2014); I. Porat and M. Cohen-Eliya Proportionality and Constitutional Culture op. cit. n. 10; E. Thomas 
Sullivan and R. S. Frase, Proportionality Principles in American Law: Controlling Excessive Government 
Actions (2008); and G. Webber, The Negotiable Constitution: On the Limitation of Rights (2009); C. Steiker, 
‘Prevention as a  Limit on the Preventive Justice’, in A. Ashworth and L. Zedner (eds.) Prevention and the 
Limits of the Criminal Law (2013) 194; G. Huscroft, B. Miller and G. Webber (eds.), Proportionality and the 
Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (2014); K. Moller, the Global Model of Constitutional Rights 
(2015) Chapter 7; V. C. Jackson, ‘Constitutional Law in an Age of Proportionality’, (2015) 124 Yale Law J. 
2680.  
12
 A. Ashworth, Sentencing and Criminal Justice (5th edition 2010); A. Ashworth and A. von 
Hirsch, Proportionate Sentencing: Exploring the Principles (2005); and A. von Hirsch and N. Jareborg, 
'Sweden's Sentencing Statute Enacted' (1989) Criminal Law Rev. 275. 
13
 C. Taylor, Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (1989); D. Wahrman, The Making of the 
Modern Self (2004); Roy Porter (ed.), Rewriting the Self: Histories from the Renaissance to the Present (1997); 
L. Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of Western Liberalism (2014).  Underlying notions of the 
subject and its relation to power are, of course, also fundamental to much of Michel Foucault’s work, notably in 
this context Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (transl. A. Sheridan, 1977). 
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rights;
14
 responsible agency.
15
  For my purposes in this paper, however, it will be sufficient to 
draw out of the rationale for a focus on proportionality provided in the previous section a 
schematic account of the trajectory of metaphors of proportionality across three dimensions.  
This account will allow us to map the differences of emphasis, meaning and inflection which 
can arise within the umbrella of a single metaphor, depending on the context in which and 
purposes for which it is invoked. 
 
1. Appeals to proportionality in different sites: law, politics, culture 
 
The appeal to proportionality as part of the project of constructing specifically modern legal 
orders finds its most prominent history in the criminal law, notably as part of an effort to 
build a modern equivalent to the premodern retributive ethic captured by the lex talionis and 
forms of discretionary, often monarchical, power.
16
  Indeed, Thomas Jefferson’s 1778 Bill for 
Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in the early formation of the United States combines 
the appeal to proportionality with a continuing commitment to talionic punishments in a 
striking way: ’Whosoever on purpose and of malice forethought shall maim another, or shall 
disfigure him, by cutting out or disabling the tongue, slitting or cutting off a nose, lip or ear, 
branding, or otherwise, shall be maimed or disfigured in like sort: or if that cannot be for 
want of the same part, then as nearly as may be in some other part of at least equal value and 
estimation in the opinion of a jury. . .’17.  In the ‘neoclassical’ revival of retributivism, 
repackaged in the sanitized form of  ‘just deserts’ in the 1970s, the appeal to proportionality 
takes a very different institutional form, realised through the technical mode of procedural 
mechanisms such as sentencing guideline systems or presumptive sentence statutes.  In each 
case, however, the work being done by the metaphor of proportionality is similar: it evokes 
the sorts of limits on power emblematic of a modern commitment to legality or the rule of 
law, and does so by implicit appeal to some natural order of rational relationship between one 
thing – a crime – and another – a penalty.    
A similar mechanism is at work in the appeal to proportionality in public law, which 
is often traced back to Prussian administrative law of the 19
th
 Century,
18
 though it 
undoubtedly has deeper roots in the liberal political thought and ancient sources already 
reviewed.  In the specific context of adjudication, as Porat and Cohen-Eliya explain, 
proportionality structures decision-making between competing rights and interests by 
 
basically requiring that any interference with rights be justified by not being 
disproportionate. It consists of four (or three, depending on your perspective) stages: 
                                                          
14
 L. Hunt, Inventing Human Rights:  A History (2007);  C. Douzinas, The End of Human Rights (2000); C. 
Douzinas and C. Gearty (ed.), The Meanings of Rights: The Philosophy and Social Theory of Human Rights 
(2014). 
15
 N. Lacey, Women, Crime and Character: From Moll Flanders to Tess of the d’Urbervilles (2008); L. Farmer, 
Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalization and Civil Order (forthcoming 2016). Engle (op. cit. n. 6) 
and Poole (op. cit. n. 6) have made important contributions to the project of mapping proportionality. 
16
  The much longer history of appeals to proportionality in just war theory in both classical and natural law 
traditions presents a fascinating precursor to modern, rationalist approaches to proportionality in penal theory – 
as indeed do the graduated fines of ecclesiastical law: see in J. Q Whitman, ‘The Transition to Modernity’, in M. 
Dubber and T. Hörnle (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Criminal Law (2014) pp. 84. 
17
 T. A. Jefferson, ‘A Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments in Cases Heretofore Capital’, op. cit. n. 9, 
quoted in J. Q Whitman, op. cit. n. 16. 
18
 Notably in Article 10(2) of the Prussian General Law of 1794.  See Porat and Cohen-Eliya (op. cit. n. 10) ch. 
2; Cohen-Eliya and Porat, ‘American Balancing and German Proportionality: The Historical Origins’ (2010) 8 
International Journal of Constitutional Law 263; S. Baer, ‘Equality: the Jurisprudence of the German 
Constitutional Court’ 5 Columbia J. of European Law 249 (1999); M. Loughlin, Foundations of Public Law 
(2010) ch. 14. 
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whenever the government infringes upon a constitutionally protected right, the 
proportionality principle requires that the government show, first, that its objective is 
legitimate and important; second, that the means chosen were rationally connected to 
achieve that objective (suitability); third, that no less drastic means were available 
(necessity); and fourth, that the benefit from realizing the objective exceeds the harm 
to the right (proportionality in the strict sense). 
 
Note that, as in the case of punishment, proportionality is here envisaged as legitimating and 
facilitating power in the very process of symbolising its constraint.  
We must, of course, be open to the possibility that the role of appeals to 
proportionality, as well as the specific institutional and doctrinal form which they take, has 
developed in different ways in different substantive areas.  But across these undoubted 
differences, as I shall argue, we see some important common themes, notably in the way in 
which proportionality invokes ideas of rationally limited power, contributing to the law’s 
claim to play a central role in the delivery of modern governance.  Indeed we can usefully 
think about this in terms of the trajectory of modern political orders and ideologies: as the 
value attached to individual freedom and the claims of individuals of bearers of civil and 
political rights - as well as the complexity and ambition of state activity – increase, there is a 
growing need to develop discourses as well as institutional arrangements capable of 
legitimating the state’s power and bolstering its credentials as both rational and reasonable. 
These appeals to the metaphor of proportionality in the law derive a good part of their 
power from the way in which they connect the exercise of legal power with doctrines and 
ideas of reason, fairness, fittingness and order circulating within broader political and indeed 
cultural discourse.  As we have seen, the appeal to proportionality had long featured in just 
war theory in both classical and natural law traditions; while from the 17
th
 Century, it began 
to be more specifically associated with the image of legitimate governance.  Hence we might 
cite, for example, the role of rationality, order and proportionality not merely in the treatises 
of Beccaria and Bentham or the reforms of Jefferson, but also, yet earlier, in Montesquieu
19
 – 
all of them core founders of the political projects of the Enlightenment and its long aftermath.  
Moreover these images of order, proportion and reason surface regularly in cultural texts such 
as novels, in which authors debated the excesses of arbitrary power under the ancien régime.   
Consider, for example, Oliver Goldsmith’s indictment of the disorder of disproportionality in 
The Vicar of Wakefield, its language reminiscent of Beccaria (whose treatise on crime and 
punishment was published two years before Goldsmith’s novel): 
 
When by indiscriminate penal laws a nation beholds the same punishment affixed to 
dissimilar degrees of guilt, from perceiving no distinction in the penalty, the people 
are led to lose all sense of distinction in the crime, and this distinction is the bulwark 
of all morality; thus the multitude of laws produces new vices, and new vices call for 
fresh restraints.
20
   
 
Law, Goldsmith argues, should be made the protector, but not the tyrant of the people. 
Of course, appeals to notions of order or ‘proper place’ may take radically different 
forms.  Take, for example, this passage from Sarah Fielding, talented sister of the (inevitably 
more famous) playwright, novelist, essayist and magistrate Henry, himself an eloquent critic 
of the cruelty and irrationality of the excesses of arbitrary power.  Fielding extols something 
                                                          
19
  Montesquieu, Beccaria, Jefferson and Bentham, op. cit. n. 9. 
20
 O. Goldsmith, The Vicar of Wakefield [1766] (1974) 150; cf. Beccaria, op. cit. n. 9. 
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reminiscent of the ontology – and aesthetics - of balance, order and reason to which the 
metaphor of proportionality invariably appeals: 
 
[I]t is in the power of every Community to attain it [real happiness], if every Member of it 
would perform the part allotted him by Nature, or his Station in Life, with a sincere 
Regard to the Interest and Pleasure of the whole.  …[I]f he acts his Part well, he deserves 
as much Applause – and is as useful a Member of Society – as any other Man whatever: 
for in every Machine, the smallest Parts conduce as much to the keeping it together, and 
to regulate its Motions, as the greatest.  That the Stage is a Picture of Life, has been 
observed by almost every body, especially since  Shakespeare’s Time: and nothing can 
make the Metaphor more strong, than the observing every  Theatrical Performance 
spoiled, by the great Desire each Performer shews of playing the Top-part – In the 
Animal and Vegetable World there would be full as much Confusion as there is in human 
Life, - was not every thing kept in its proper Place.
21
   
 
Note that the ontology which Fielding evokes leaves open the question of the source of its 
conception of ‘proper Place’ and harmony, with the reference to ‘station in life’ suggesting a 
notion of fixed status relations which was precisely what the emerging ideas of rational and 
limited governance were straining against.  Yet while the metaphor of proportionality evokes 
a horizontal relationship of equivalence rather than one imposed from above, the very idea of 
equivalence seems to participate in some sort metaphysical or ontological claim.  
 
1. Appeals to proportionality across space: nations and regions 
 
The idea of proportionality is pervasive in modern, Western legal systems: it transcends the 
civilian/common law and other classificatory divisions.
22
   Appeals to proportionality are not, 
however, invariant across space. (Much the same can be said of the metaphor of balancing, as 
convincingly demonstrated in Jacco Bomhoff’s comparison of US and German constitutional 
law.)
23
  While proportionality, as we have seen, operates explicitly within foundational texts 
in the emergence of both English and American criminal justice systems, and in the early 
development of Prussian administrative law, and while strong family resemblances around 
images of natural order, reason and rationally limited power inform each of these appeals, the 
trajectories of appeals to proportionality in different jurisdictions have varied widely, and are 
always coloured by the cultural, political and institutional context in which they arise.  
Hence, as Porat and Eliya-Cohen have noted, proportionality has had relatively restricted 
airtime in 20
th
 Century American constitutional law discourse, at just the time during which it 
has been travelling rapidly across European jurisdictions, including the common law system 
of England and Wales, in large part as a result of the jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights and the parallel and rather different proportionality jurisprudence of the 
European Court of Justice.
24
  Conversely, proportionality played a key role in American 
criminal justice reforms of the 1970s and 1980s, as in the reforms of a wide range of 
countries from Australia to Sweden. And this variation, of course, raises fascinating questions 
                                                          
21
 Sarah Fielding, The Adventures of David Simple Containing an Account of his Travels through the Cities of 
London and Westminster in Search of a Real Friend first published 1741 (2007)  p 234; Cf H. Fielding, Tom 
Jones [1749] (1998).  
22
  M. Damaska, The Faces of Justice and State Authority: A Comparative Approach to the Legal Process 
(1986). 
23
  J. Bomhoff, Balancing Constitutional Rights op. cit n. 11 above. 
24
 Op. cit. n. 10 above, p. 3: Porat and Cohen-Eliya attribute this variation to underlying differences in American 
and European attitudes to governmental power. 
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of comparative law - and indeed of comparative social science more generally - about the 
conditions or events which prompt appeals to proportionality at particular times and in 
particular places. 
 
2. Appeals to proportionality across different subject matter 
 
Finally, even within legal arenas, as we have already seen, proportionality features in a vast 
range of areas of law, and has accordingly spawned an enormous literature, particularly over 
the last 20 years.
25
  For obvious reasons, it finds its origins in, broadly speaking, public law – 
operating in criminal justice, in administrative law, and, most recently, in human rights and in 
areas such as anti-discrimination law, to temper, moderate and legitimate power, bringing it 
within the limits dictated by ideals of modern democratic governance, keenly attentive to the 
potential for abuse of public power.  Yet it has also found a place in private law – perhaps 
reflecting the recognition that gross inequalities of private power, along with the increasing 
involvement of private bodies in exercising public functions and hence wielding quasi-public 
power, are rendering the development of analogous checks on the power deriving from 
money or commercial influence – or, at least, the symbolism of such checks - relatively more 
important.  In a world in which power is closely allied with money and ‘spheres of justice’ 
become increasingly blurred, the traditional distinction between public and private power 
calls for deconstruction, and necessitates the development of doctrines and practices limiting 
private as much as public power.
26
  If private power can, in effect, enable or constrain public 
rights, then the same legitimation needs which I have argued to underpin the appeal to 
proportionality in public law resonate in private law.  I will return to this issue below.    
 
DECONSTRUCTING PROPORTIONALITY: THE CASE OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE 
 
How should we interpret the pervasive appeal to proportionality across so many areas of legal 
argumentation in so many contemporary systems?  At one level, we might be tempted to 
deconstruct this as a widespread instance of ideological obfuscation. What have been the 
effects of the appeal to proportionality, with its promise of determinate limits on power? 
Might we not argue that what has been thought of as proportionality is, after all, not a 
naturally existing relationship, but a product of political and social construction, cultural 
meaning-making, and institution-building, and that the purported appeal to a naturally 
existing relationship is therefore a proper object of careful critique or even of suspicion?  For 
                                                          
25
 In addition to the references mentioned at n. 10 above, see N. Emiliou, The Principle of Proportionality in 
European Law; A Comparative Study (1996); D. Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (2004); A. 
Baker ‘Proportionality and Employment Discrimination in the UK’ (2008) Industrial Law J. 37(4) 305; V. C. 
Jackson, ‘Being proportional about proportionality’ (2004) 21 Constitutional Commentary 803; A. Stone Sweet 
and J. Mathews, ‘Proportionality, balancing and global constitutionalism’ (2008) 19 Columbia J. of 
Transnational Law 72, 162; A. Stone Sweet and J. Mathews, ‘All things in proportion? American rights doctrine 
and the problem of balancing’ (2011) 60 Emory Law J. 101; M. Poto, ‘The Principle of Proportionality in 
Comparative Perspective’ (2007) 8 German Law J. 835; M. Andenaes and S. Zleptnig, ‘Proportionality: WTO 
Law in Comparative Perspective’, 42 Texas International Law Journal 371 (2007);  A.D. Mitchell, 
‘Proportionality and Remedies in WTO Disputes’ (2007) 17(5) European J. of International Law 985; D. 
Grimm, ‘Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence’ (2007) 57 University of 
Toronto Law J. 383;  A. Ristroph, ‘Proportionality as a Principle of Limited Government’ (2005) 55 Duke Law 
J. 263.  For a useful review of the range and trajectory of appeals to proportionality in different areas of law, see 
Engle op. cit. n. 6 pp. 6-10. 
26
  The recent ‘cash for honours’ scandal in British government is a spectacular example of this sort of blurring: 
on the case for distinctive spheres of justice, see M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and 
Equality (1983).  
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example, the appeal to proportionality in the ‘neoclassical’ retributive revival in the United 
Kingdom and, most vividly, the United States, has been accompanied by a marked increase in 
the exercise of the state’s penalising power, inviting the sceptical thought that appeals to 
proportionality are little more than rhetorical window-dressing. On this view, such appeals 
are, in the original sense of the term, ideological in that they obscure our view of social 
reality. It is of particular significance in this context that proportionality operates to legitimate 
as well as purporting (indeed, by purporting) to constrain the exercise of power. 
In a recent paper,
27
 Hanna Pickard and I mounted precisely this sort of critique of the 
appeal to proportionality in penal law and policy debate.  We argued that the capacity of 
appeals to proportionality to limit power was contingent upon its articulation with cultural 
and institutional features of the surrounding context.  In an effort to understand the way in 
which contemporary appeals to proportionality as a limiting principle in criminal justice have 
had such different effects in different countries, we contrasted the cultural and institutional 
structure of not only different contemporary advanced democracies, but also early modern 
systems in which a more symbolic, less rationalist conception of proportionality seems to 
have been at work in legitimising and stabilising broadly talionic punishments.
28
   In essence, 
we argued that the capacity of early modern systems to coordinate punishment in such a way 
that it was perceived as fitting to the crime derived from a hierarchical social order, an 
association of certain forms of penal and political authority with the sacred, and the currency 
of a distinctive symbolism of equivalence. Though inconsistent with modern ideas of 
proportionality, particularly in the discretionary power which implied uneven application of 
penalties, we suggested that these three features of the context in which penal practice went 
forward in very different societies sheds light on how substantive criteria of fittingness or 
equivalence depend upon background social and cultural conditions.  We then drew on this 
analysis to argue that the neoclassical revival of the late 20
th
 century was problematic from its 
inception, because the metaphors of ‘desert’ and proportionality, particularly in certain 
countries, were no longer so obviously grounded in the widely shared symbolic systems 
representing agreed social norms, or in the forms of political or religious authority, which 
previously animated and stabilised substantive judgments of equivalence or fittingness.
  
 
We might summarise these developments as moving from a conception of fittingness 
grounded in appeals to divine command or reason – a form of vertical authority if you like – 
to a conception of fittingness grounded in the more horizontal –  still allegedly ‘objective’ , 
but purportedly more rational – concept of proportionality.  In relation to punishment, 
Beccaria
29
 and Bentham
30
 are, with good reason, thought of as the key figures in this 
modernisation of the rationale of the state’s exercise of its power towards a neoclassical 
aspiration, though even here there is significant variation.  Beccaria is of particular 
importance in that his work stands as an important modern source of both of the two main 
ideas which have coincided and competed with one another as justifications of state 
punishment. These are, first, the argument that punishment is in some sense a morally 
appropriate equivalent to an offence, and is thus constrained by the requirement of 
proportionality, reviving ancient ideas of a natural order (an argument to be found in pure 
retributive form in the work of, for example, Kant, who further saw the imposition of 
deserved punishment as obligatory rather than merely permissible); and, second, the 
                                                          
27
  Lacey and Pickard op cit n. 1. 
28
  Pace Engle, op. cit. n. 6, the lex talionis is in my view a clear case of distributive justice in Aristotle’s sense, 
and accordingly a close analogue of proportionality. On the logic of early punishments, see in particular P. C. 
Spierenburg, The Spectacle of Suffering: Executions and the Evolution of Repression: from a Preindustrial 
Metropolis to the European Experience (1984). 
29
 C. Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (op. cit. n. 9). 
30
 J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (op. cit. n. 9). 
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utilitarian argument that punishment, as a prima facie evil, can only be justified by 
countervailing good consequences, achieved through specific or general deterrence, 
incapacitation, rehabilitation, restitution or moral education (an argument worked out, with a 
rigour approaching obsession, by Bentham).
31
  
But what is the potential of this modernist, rationalist appeal to proportionality to limit 
penal power in practice?  Empirical studies indicate a noteworthy degree of consensus, even 
across different countries, on the relative seriousness of standard offences – so-called ‘ordinal 
proportionality’.32 But they reveal no such consensus about what this implies in terms of what 
penalty is suitable – ‘cardinal proportionality’.33  In ‘core’ areas of criminal law, appeals to 
ordinal proportionality may therefore provide some basis for institutional arrangements such 
as sentencing guidelines.
34
  The consensus of powerful epistemic communities in the legal 
and political spheres allowed for a concrete institutionalisation of agreed norms of 
proportionality through the enactment of the various programmes of sentencing reform 
launched in many jurisdictions in the wake of the just deserts movement. And these provide 
plentiful examples of successful institutionalisation of stable relativities between penalties.  
To this extent, proportionality has indeed been successfully concretised in the criminal justice 
context.  But the lack of any comparable consensus about cardinal proportionality implies 
that appeals to proportionality are unlikely to be a successful basis in and of themselves for 
institutionalising substantive criteria of a punishment’s ‘fitness’: the actual content and level 
of the scale as a whole cannot be constrained by an appeal to proportionality in the absence of 
consensus around conventions about where the scale should be pitched (consensus  moreover 
which both common sense and empirical research show to be lacking in many social 
contexts).
35
  Hence the constraining power of the appeal to proportionality is contingent upon 
other aspects of the context and system in which it operates.  
Proportionality, in short, does not have an independent effect: where it ‘works’ to 
limit punishment, this is because of its articulation of, and resonance with, deeper 
conventions, normative systems, political institutions, and social structures.   The challenge, 
accordingly, is to try to understand the conditions under which proportionality both gains its 
appeal and has some potential to limit power: whether through consensus within a powerful 
epistemic community such as a judiciary, and/or through its being situated within detailed 
rules, doctrines and institutional arrangements. 
 
                                                          
31
 Again pace Engle (op. cit. n. 6), I would regard the utilitarian tradition as containing a distinctive iteration of 
the appeal to proportionality – as indeed is explicit in Bentham’s Introduction to the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation op. cit. n. 9. 
32
 P. H. Robinson, R. Kurzban, and O.D. Jones, ‘The origins of shared intuitions of justice’ (2007) Vanderbilt 
Law R. 60, 1633; P. H. Robinson and J. M. Darley ‘Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and 
Justice Policy’ (2007) 81 Southern California Law Rev. 1; and P. H. Robinson and R. O. Kurzban (2007) 
‘Concordance and Conflict in Intuitions of Justice’ 91 Minnesota Law Rev. 1831-1907. 
33
 It is further the case that, while there is also evidence that the perceived severity of an offence predicts the 
intensity of the response judged by experimental subjects to be appropriate, perceived severity does not predict 
whether subjects opt for a punitive or a reparative response: M. Bang Petersen, A. Sell, J. Tooby and L. 
Cosmides ‘Evolutionary psychology and criminal justice: A recalibrational theory of punishment and 
reconciliation’ in Human Morality and Sociality: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives, ed. H. Hogh-
Oleson (2010) 72. See below for discussion; and N. Lacey and H. Pickard, ‘To blame or to forgive? Reconciling 
punishment and forgiveness in criminal justice’ (2015) Oxford J. of Legal Studies doi: 10.1093/ojls/gqv012. 
34
  Even ordinal proportionality may be much hard to motivate beyond ‘standard’ offences, and hence across the 
wide terrain of so-called ‘regulatory’ offences or areas such as corporate crime.  And yet more widely, changing 
attitudes, at different paces in different countries, relating to offences as disparate as driving under the influence 
of alcohol, insider trading and various forms of sexual conduct may complicate assessments of ordinal 
proportionality even in areas traditionally regarded as mala in se.  
35
 Op. cit. n.32 and 33. 
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RECONSTRUCTING PROPORTIONALITY 
 
In effect, then, Pickard’s and my deconstruction of the appeal to proportionality in 
contemporary criminal justice claimed that this metaphorical trope amounts to no more than a 
first step in the crucial and complicated processes of meaning-making, consensus-building 
and institutional development necessary to limit punishment and appropriate to current 
conceptions of political and social authority.  In early modern systems, state authority was 
invested with, if not explicitly theological, at least some form of sacredness; and social orders 
were formed around a cosmology or system of meaning in which there appears to have been a 
remarkable degree of consensus about appropriate penalties notwithstanding their 
disproportionate use against the poor, in a context of extraordinary levels of inequality and 
deprivation.  Of course, by the latter part of the 18
th
 Century the legitimacy of the relevant 
social, political and penal systems was under question, and they were comprehensively 
reformed over the following century.  But this process of rationalising and modernising 
reform undoubtedly extinguished certain governmental resources which cannot be revived in 
contemporary conditions.   
What relevance does this argument about appeals to proportionality in the context of 
criminal justice have for other areas of law in which they increasingly feature?  Needless to 
say, there are likely to be significant differences attendant on the different functions, doctrinal 
structure and institutional embedding of different areas of law.  Yet some of the same 
problems and opportunities can be observed – and in particular, the challenge of grounding 
and making concrete the power-constraining potential of appeals to proportionality.  The 
institutional solutions and background conditions may be different, but the basic structure of 
the challenge is similar.  What is more, as Poole notes,
36
 it is far from clear that modern 
appeals to proportionality have really abandoned the metaphysical pretensions of their 
classical forbears.  And giving a clear shape to a renewed vision of that underlying 
cosmology in more sceptical, rationalist times is no easy task.  As Poole elaborates:   
 
The task of the decision-maker applying proportionality is to identify those elements 
and values and then to fashion them in a way that produces a harmony of the parts and 
therefore justice. Now, this task (or at least the first stage of it) might not be too 
difficult in practice. The values at stake might be obvious. But where they are not, 
there is a danger that either the judges would be rudderless or the direction they 
steered would not have been agreed already by the polity at large. Both problems 
loom larger for us (perhaps) than for those who articulated the classical model.
37
 
 
In light of this difficulty, our task must be one of more thoroughgoing institutional and 
normative reconstruction which coheres with the resources which are now regarded as 
legitimate and meaningful. 
Our deconstruction of appeals to proportionality, however, is not inconsistent with a 
recognition of the need to engage in that sort of reconstructive project. In this concluding 
section, I want to suggest that such a project must engage with two further questions.  First, it 
must ask what has prompted the resurgence of appeals to proportionality in so many countries 
and across so many doctrinal areas – while holding in mind the likelihood that there will be 
different explanations across different areas.  Second, it must work towards a better 
understanding of the conditions under which, in differently structured modern legal and 
social systems, appeals to the metaphor of proportionality are most likely to have the limiting 
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  Poole, op. cit. n. 6, p. 389. 
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effect which they claim – and, conversely, it must be alive to the power of this metaphor to 
obscure the realities of power by holding out a promise of limits which remains purely 
rhetorical.   
Turning to the first question: why has proportionality experienced such a marked 
increase in its pervasiveness as one of law’s legitimating metaphors?   As we would expect, 
the reasons vary across doctrinal areas.  In criminal justice, the resurgence of appeals to 
proportionality has been a function of the neoclassical revival in the wake of the collapse of 
the rehabilitative ideal in the US, Britain, Australia and many other European and Nordic 
countries. It has also been a tool wielded by legislators in an effort to constrain judicial 
discretion.   In public law, the growth of appeals to proportionality has been a product of the 
rapid growth of the field of human rights and has delivered significant interpretive power to 
judges.  This set of developments was of course prompted in large part by the traumatic 
abuses of governmental power which culminated in the Second World War.  The 
determination to avoid future such excesses directly informed the development of the United 
Nations and of the European Convention of Human Rights.  These political developments 
have been further underpinned by transnational legal institutions such as the European Court 
of Human Rights and, in a separate line of development, the European Court of Justice, 
which have allowed concepts nested within a particular system to travel to other systems, 
adapting themselves in the process to their new environments, and which have increased the 
power and significance of judicial review of governmental power at both national and 
transnational levels.  In public international law, again fostered by its engagement with 
human rights norms and by the growth of humanitarian law and the explosion of specialist 
courts, the longstanding role of proportionality in just war theory has experienced a renewed 
momentum and a wider significance.  Moreover ideas of proportionality have found their way 
into entirely new areas such as the regulation of international trade, via the framework of the 
World Trade Organisation.  So one might simply regard the current pervasiveness of the 
metaphor of proportionality as the outcome of a number of contingent and, to some extent, 
unrelated institutional developments.   
But to see the current emphasis on proportionality exclusively in these terms would, I 
think, be to beg the question of just why this metaphor – out of many others which might 
have had a resonance in relation to the need to limit punishment - has such appeal, and in 
doing so to miss something of importance to socio-legal studies.  Certainly, there is much 
merit to Stone Sweet’s and Mathews’ suggestion38 that proportionality tests appeal to judges 
because of their capacity to underpin a wide measure of judicial discretion: indeed, this is 
precisely an upshot of the indeterminacy of the concept of proportionality already noted in 
our discussion of criminal justice.  But there is surely more to be said about why, specifically, 
this particular discretion-legitimating concept has gained such traction. Speculative though 
any such suggestion may be, I would like to argue that there is indeed some more general 
significance to the current salience of proportionality across systems and contexts.  Just as 
there was a certain counter-intuitiveness to the resurgence of ideas of ‘community’ in the 
1980s, as politics in the advanced democracies was moving in an ever more individualistic 
and even libertarian direction,
39
 much the same might be said about the pervasive appeal to 
proportionality in a world ever more organised around the sway of unconstrained market 
forces and the naked power of money.  Greater and greater numbers of the world’s 
inhabitants experience themselves as living in a market culture – sometimes loosely 
characterised as ‘neoliberal’ - apparently intent, in Wendy Brown’s resonant phrase, on 
Undoing the Demos.
40
  And many advanced democracies have witnessed a significant 
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40
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attenuation of the welfare and other social and political institutions designed to provide a 
measure of distributive justice and to counter pure market power.  In such a context, the idea 
that we have in place legal arrangements still capable of constraining – indeed proportioning 
– power along the lines of longstanding constitutional aspirations may have particular force - 
just as the warm if unspecific appeal to ‘community’ provided a comforting fantasy of 
connection and interdependence in an increasingly atomistic and competitive world of 
‘ontological insecurity’.41  This speculative thesis would speak in particular to 
proportionality’s expansion into the terrain of private law. 
If this speculation has any merit, it implies that we must attend carefully to the 
dangers as well as the positive potential of law’s metaphors.  For it is precisely through their 
method of carrying meaning over from one thing to another that they bear the potential to 
mislead: to conjure up a legitimating image which is distant from the realities of the power 
relations embedded in law as enforced.  And here, to move to our second question, it 
becomes truly important to focus on context, and in particular on the features of different 
contexts which affect the capacity of appeals to metaphors such as proportionality to deliver 
the values or outcomes to which they aspire and through which they add their persuasive and 
legitimating force to legal discourse.  In criminal justice as elsewhere,
42
 it is where metaphors 
such as proportionality are articulated with widely held attitudes or well established 
institutional practices which help to coordinate expectations that they hold their greatest 
potential to limit power in something like the way that their rhetorical force promises.  Our 
evaluation of law’s metaphors, in short, must not be confined to their conceptual structure, 
their discursive form or even their doctrinal elaboration: it must also attend to the institutional 
arrangements which provide the framework for their interpretation and enforcement; and to 
the interests and power relations which shape their development and implementation. 
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  A. Giddens, Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age (1991). 
42
  See Lacey and Pickard, op. cit. n. 1. 
